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DAMAGES: "VALUE OF THE CONTRACT," A NOVEL
STANDARD FOR ASSESSING DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS
IN the recent case of Espaillat v. Berlitz Schools of Languages of
America, Incorporated,1 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit synthesized tort and contract theories to produce a
novel standard for the assessment of damages. Defendant Berlitz
fraudulently induced Espaillat to enter into a one-year service con-
tract to teach at a United States Army language school by assuring
her that her Dominican Republic citizenship would have no effect
on her future employment. Two months later, upon discovery of
her alien status, the Army, in accordance with its established policy
of which Berlitz had knowledge, forced Berlitz to terminate her em-
ployment. Following the expiration of the contract period, Espaillat
filed a complaint in the District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions alleging breach of contract. Later she restated her claim
on the ground of fraud, apparently in reliance upon the successful
employment of a fraud theory in a parallel case, Andolsun v. Berlitz
Schools of Languages of America, Incorporated,2 involving another
language instructor dismissed under similar circumstances. Sub-
sequent to a damage award of $2,000 by a jury, the court granted a
motion for a judgment n.o.v. in favor of Berlitz. Since Espaillat
had failed to prove previous earnings, an element of damages
essential to recovery under a fraud theory in the District of Colum-
bia, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the judg-
ment;4 but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, rejecting traditional damages standards as inapplicable, reversed
and ordered a new trial limited to assessment of damages under the
criteria which it established.5
Damages for an employer's breach of a personal service contract
are ordinarily based upon the amount of wages that would have been
383 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
196 A.2d 926 (D.C. App. 1964).
2Espaillat v. Berlitz Schools of Languages of America, Inc., 217 A.2d 655, 656
(D.C. App. 1966).
'Id. at 658.
5 383 F.2d at 224.
paid but for the breach.6 Added to this amount are consequential
damages, such as the employee's cost of procuring new employment,7
less wages earned during the remainder of the contract period follow-
ing the breach.8 Had the plaintiff in Espaillat not modified her suit
on the contract, her recovery would have been approximately $3,500:
$6,000 in unpaid wages, plus a $250 cost of procuring new employ-
ment, less $2,750 earned after the breach.9 In a tort action for
fraudulent misrepresentation, on the other hand, a plaintiff is en-
titled to recover damages for all losses naturally and proximately
resulting from the fraud.10 Two standards have been used to mea-
sure the proximity of the loss to the fraud. The "out of pocket" or
tort standard, applied by the English courts in the common law
action of deceit," and by a minority of American jurisdictions,12
contemplates placing the victim in a position equivalent to that
existing before the inception of the fraudulent contract.13 Under
this standard a party injured by breach of a fraudulently induced
personal service contract could recover the earnings sacrificed in
order to enter the contract,14 less the aggregate of wages earned
pursuant to the contract and following the breach, plus the cost of
securing new employment.' 5 A more liberal damage standard, tradi-
tionally applied in tort to fraudulent real and personal property sales
transactions, 8 is the "benefit of the bargain" rule, which focuses
upon the representations made and attempts to award the fraud
8 See 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 958 (1951); 2 T. SEDWcWci, DAMAGES § 667 (9th ed.
1913); 3 S. WISrON, CONTRACTS §§ 1358-59 (rev. ed. 1937).
7 E.g., Beggs v. Dougerty Overseas, Inc., 287 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961); see 5 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1044 (1964); C. McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES § 163 (1935).
8 See 5 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039 (1964); C. McCoRMicK, supra note 7, § 158.
9 For the true values see 383 F.2d at 221 n.2, 222, 224 n.11.
10 See Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1900); Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125,
129 (1889); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (3d ed. 1964); Note, Measure of Damages for
Fraud and Deceit, 47 VA. L. REv. 1209 (1961); Note, 22 B.U.L. REv. 295, 298 (1942).
"See McConnel v. Wright, [1903] 1 Ch. 546; Peek v. Derry, 37 Ch. D. 541 (1887),
rev'd on other grounds, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
12 See McCormick, Damages in Actions for Fraud and Deceit, 28 Nw. U.L. REv.
1050, 1052 & nn.11-16 (1934); Note, Measure of Damages for Fraud and Deceit, 47 VA.
L. REv. 1209, 1212 & n.16 (1961).
'
2 See C. McCoRmiCK, supra note 7, § 121; W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 751;
McCormick, supra note 12, at 1051; Rossen & Fairweather, Damages in Fraud Actions,
13 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rxv. 288 (1964).
U See authorities cited note 13 supra.
25 See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
16 E.g., Ren v. Jones, 38 Ariz. 476, 479, 1 P.2d 110, 111 (1931); Kendrick v. Ryus,
225 Mo. 150, 160, 123 S.W. 937, 941 (1909); Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis. 222, 223, 52
N.W. 88, 89 (1892).
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victim the value of his frustrated expectations.' 7 Under this theory,
adopted by a majority of the states,' the defrauding defendant is
viewed as warranting the truth of his statements. Thus plaintiff's
recovery is based on the difference between the represented value
and the consideration actually delivered by the defrauder. To this
would be added the cost of procuring new employment, less wages
received subsequent to the breach of contract.19
The amending of the complaint in Espaillat from breach of con-
tract to fraudulent inducement would have had no effect upon the
amount of Espaillat's recovery if the requested "benefit of the bar-
gain" standard had been applied, for the elements of damage compu-
tation are identical under either approach. Hypothetically, Es-
paillat would have been awarded $3,500 damages under either
theory.20 Unfortunately for Espaillat, however, the District of Co-
lumbia courts have rejected the "benefit of the bargain" theory and
adopted the "out of pocket" standard.21 Since the awarding of "out
of pocket" damages is based upon the earnings sacrificed in order
to enter the contract, recovery is dependent upon the successful
establishment of a pre-contract employment record.2 2 To obtain a
recovery equal to that obtainable under the contract theory, a plain-
tiff's pre-contract wage level must equal the contract wage.23 Due to
the part-time nature of Espaillat's previous employment, she was
unable to establish adequately the value of her previous earnings,
and under existing law was consequently barred from recovering
damages.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
reversing, established that in light of the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions by Berlitz, and the successful recovery in the Andolsun case,24
the lack of a clear comparison between wages earned before and after
17 See McCormick, supra note 12, at 1053 & n.18; Rossen & Fairweather, supra note
13, at 291; Note, Measure of Damages for Fraud and Deceit, 47 VA. L. Rav. 1209, 1220-
21 (1961); Note, 22 B.U.L. REv. 295, 298 (1942).
I. See McCormick, supra note 12, at 1052-53 & n.18; Note, Measure of Damages for
Fraud and Deceit, 47 VA. L. RxV. 1209, 1210 & n.7 (1961); Note, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 133,
134 & n.9 (1940).
29 See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
20 See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
-1 Espaillat v. Berlitz Schools of Languages of America, Inc., 217 A.2d 655, 657
(D.C. App. 1966).
2 2 Id.
238 See notes 6-8, 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
21 See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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the contract was not a compelling ground for the total denial of a
remedy.2 5 Finding merit in Supreme Court dissatisfaction with
the traditional damage standards as applied in securities fraud
cases,26 the circuit court determined that neither the "out of pocket"
nor the "benefit of the bargain" standard provided "an apt gauge
for recovery" in the case of a fraudulently induced service contract.27
A proper measure of damages, the court indicated, would be based
upon the "value of the contract" to Espaillat; and this value, unlike
value under the "benefit of the bargain" standard, is not fixed by
the proposed contract salary.28 The court concluded that three fac-
tors are to be weighed by the jury in its determination of this value-
the plaintiff's qualifications; the worth of the plaintiff's services as
evidenced by her previous experience, proposed contract wages, and
the value given to her services following the breach of contract; and
the "earning power" of the plaintiff in the various services she would
have performed under the contract.29 In addition, the plaintiff's
recovery would include the cost of procuring new employment after
the breach. The aggregate of these consequential damages and the
value of the contract would be reduced by wages earned pursuant to
the contract and following the breach to determine the amount of
the award.
Since juries are often called upon to assess the value of services
in quantum meruit and to determine the value of such abstract
items as mental anguish or physical pain,30 the standard fashioned by
the Espaillat court seems neither too speculative nor too difficult to
apply. In addition, the risk of inexactitude has traditionally fallen
on the defrauding defendant rather than on an innocent victim of
the fraud.31 The opinion does not, however, resolve the issue of
the precise breadth of discretion given the jury in valuing the con-
tract. In addition to elements mentioned in the opinion, other fac-
tors, such as job security, working conditions, business contacts, and
25 383 F.2d at 222-23.
20 Id. at 222, citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194
(1963).
"8 383 F.2d at 223.
28 Id.
"OId. at 224.
"0E.g., Fowler Rental Equip. Co. v. Skipper, 276 Ala. 593, 604, 165 So. 2d 375,
386 (1964); Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Hawaii 408, 424, 390 P.2d 740, 750 (1964).
"' See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946); Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
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personal satisfaction, may be relevant in determining the "value of
the contract" to the plaintiff, and seemingly should be considered.
In any event, it seems unlikely that a jury would determine the
value of an employment contract to a defrauded plaintiff to be less
than the wages promised. The minimum recovery, therefore, can be
expected to equal the amount awarded in an action based on breach
of contract, or on fraudulent inducement to contract, when damages
are measured by the "benefit of the bargain" standard. On the
other hand, the "value of the contract" could be found to be sig-
nificantly greater than the contract wages proposed. Thus, the
attorney who is willing to accept the additional burden of proof
required to establish fraud may find it advantageous in a suit on a
fraudulently induced personal service contract to plead fraudulent
inducement as an alternative ground for recovery, and seek applica-
tion of the "value of the contract" standard applied in Espaillat.
